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1 
THE SHOT (NOT) HEARD ’ROUND THE 
WORLD: RECONSIDERING THE 
PERPLEXING U.S. PREOCCUPATION  
WITH THE SEPARATION OF LEGISLATIVE 
AND EXECUTIVE POWERS 
Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr.* 
Abstract: Since the drafting of the U.S. Constitution in 1787, the docu-
ment has served as a model for constitutional design for many other 
democratic polities. Core elements of U.S. constitutionalism, including 
adoption of a written constitution, entrenched and judicially enforce-
able human rights, and federalism, have become commonplace in other 
nations’ constitutions. One key element of U.S. constitutional structure, 
however, has failed to find a receptive audience abroad: the separation 
of legislative and executive powers. Most modern democracies have 
broken with the British model of parliamentary supremacy in favor of 
some system of judicial enforcement of entrenched human rights, but 
nevertheless have retained the British practice of selecting the heads of 
executive branch agencies from within the ranks of the legislature. This 
Article explores the U.S. commitment to separating and dividing legisla-
tive and executive powers, and posits cultural pluralism as a key reason 
for this structural commitment. In addition, it suggests that creating a 
political check on the legislative process provides an additional norma-
tive reason for embracing the practice. In the end, U.S. separation of 
powers doctrine reflects the distinctive nature of the polity: in a cultural 
jambalaya, citizens have good cause to be suspicious of the government 
and its motives, and hence to establish structural safeguards against the 
perceived risk of tyranny. 
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Introduction 
 The United States has been both an importer and an exporter of 
constitutional structure since at least the Federal Convention in 1787, 
at which the Framers considered a variety of foreign constitutional 
models, including both contemporary and ancient, when fashioning 
the Constitution.1 Although Great Britain’s unwritten constitution pro-
vided the most obvious template, it was by no means the only available 
model.2 By 1787, most states had extensive experience with constitu-
tional design.3 The adoption of the Declaration of Independence in 
1776 led to a spate of new constitution-making at the state level, as the 
newly independent former colonies felt it necessary to establish new 
constitutions for their independent republics.4 The Articles of Confed-
eration, drafted in 1776–1777, ratified in 1781, and now largely forgot-
ten, also served as the first blueprint for federal governance.5 Thus, as 
Professor Paul Carrington correctly states, “[w]hile the idea of a written 
constitution enforced by national courts was an American novelty, it was 
less novel than many may suppose.”6 
 Of course, the Framers did not completely abandon the British 
model of constitutional structure.7 Congress, a bicameral institution, is 
loosely modeled on the British Parliament, which was—and still is— 
comprised of two chambers, the House of Commons and the House of 
                                                                                                                      
1 See, e.g., The Federalist No. 38, at 232–33 ( James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961) (discussing the constitutions of Athens, Sparta, and Rome); The Federalist No. 39, 
at 240–41 ( James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (citing and discussing the consti-
tutions of Holland, Venice, Poland, and England). On the Framers’ familiarity and reli-
ance on foreign and historical constitutions, see William A. Galston, The Use and Abuse of 
the Classics in American Constitutionalism, 66 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 47, 50–51 (1990); Akhil Reed 
Amar, Architexture, 77 Ind. L.J. 671, 672–73 (2002); Edward L. Rubin, Getting Past Democracy, 
149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 711, 717–18 (2001); Jonathan Turley, The Military Pocket Republic, 97 Nw. 
U. L. Rev. 1, 68 (2002). 
2 See The Federalist No. 38, supra note 1; The Federalist No. 39, supra note 1. 
3 The advocates of ratification of the new Constitution expressly admitted this state of 
affairs—along with acknowledging that the draft federal constitution reflected some reli-
ance on these preexisting state constitutional models. See The Federalist No. 39, supra 
note 1, at 242; The Federalist No. 47, at 303–07 ( James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961); see also Paul D. Carrington, Writing Other Peoples’ Constitutions, 33 N.C. J. Int’l & 
Com. Reg. 167, 169–70 (2007). 
4 See Carrington, supra note 3, at 170. 
5 See Alfred H. Kelly et al., The American Constitution: Its Origins and De-
velopment 78 (7th ed. 1991). 
6 Carrington, supra note 3, at 169. 
7 See Vicki C. Jackson & Mark Tushnet, Comparative Constitutional Law 362 
(1st ed. 1999). 
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Lords.8 Although the manner of selection and underlying purposes dif-
fer, the adoption of a bicameral legislature plainly reflects an homage 
to the British model.9 Similarly, specific provisions of the U.S. Constitu-
tion reflect longstanding British constitutional practices such as the 
Speech and Debate Clause10 and the Jury Trial Clause.11 
                                                                                                                      
8 See id. at 360; see also James Hyre, Comment, The United Kingdom’s Declaration of Judi-
cial Independence: Creating a Supreme Court to Secure Individual Rights Under the Human Rights 
Act of 1998, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 423, 428 (2004). 
9 The Framers intended the Senate, with its equal representation of all states regard-
less of population, to provide a means for smaller states to protect their interests against 
the potential depredations of the larger, more populous states. Kelly et al., supra note 5, 
at 93. The House of Lords, by way of contrast, existed to ensure that the commons would 
not disregard the institutional powers and prerogatives of the British hereditary aristocracy 
and those of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. Hyre, supra note 8, at 429. In both cases, however, 
the upper chamber existed to temper the potential excesses of the lower, more democratic 
house. 
10 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 6 (“The Senators and Representatives shall . . . be privileged 
from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in go-
ing and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall 
not be questioned in any other place.”); see also Chastain v. Sundquist, 833 F.2d 311, 319–
22 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (tracing history of the Speech and Debate Clause back to its British 
roots and canvassing applicable U.S. Supreme Court precedents applying the clause). The 
privilege relates back to the English Bill of Rights, which William and Mary promulgated 
in 1688. See Bill of Rights, 1 W. & M. sess. 2, c. 2 (1688) (Eng.), reprinted in 10 Halsbury’s 
Statutes of England and Wales 44 (4th ed. reprint 2007) (1985) (providing “that the 
freedome of speech and debates or proceedings in Parlyament ought not to be impeached 
or questioned in any court or place out of Parlyament”); see also Eastland v. U.S. Service-
men’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 502 (1975) (“The Clause is a product of the English experi-
ence.”); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204 (1881) (explaining that the Speech and 
Debate Clause derives from the English tradition); Joseph Story, Commentaries on the 
Constitution § 863 (1833) (“This privilege [the Speech and Debate Clause] also is de-
rived from the practice of the British Parliament, and was in full exercise in our colonial 
legislatures, and now belongs to the legislature of every State in the Union as matter of 
constitutional right.”). 
11 See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2 (“The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeach-
ment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall 
have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such 
Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.”). The Sixth Amendment re-
states the right to a jury trial and extends the scope of the right by expressly requiring “a 
speedy and public trial,” “by an impartial jury,” with the defendant “to be informed of the 
nature and cause of accusation,” and “to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to 
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of 
Counsel for his defence.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. The right to trial by jury preexisted U.S. 
independence from Great Britain and was simply incorporated into the new domestic legal 
regime as a continuation of this preexisting right. See Joseph Story, A Familiar Exposi-
tion of the Constitution § 384 (Lawbook Exchange 1999) (1840) (explaining that trial 
by jury in criminal cases “was, from very early times, insisted on by our ancestors in the 
parent country [Great Britain], as the great bulwark of their civil and political liberties, 
and watched with an unceasing jealousy and solicitude,” observing that “[t]he right consti-
tutes a fundamental article of Magna Charta,” and noting that colonial legal systems in the 
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 To be sure, the Framers departed from the British model and did 
so in significant ways.12 The Framers’ major structural innovations in-
clude a written constitution (as opposed to the unwritten, or only par-
tially written, British Constitution), a judiciary vested with the power to 
review legislative and executive acts for consistency with the Constitu-
tion, federalism featuring shared sovereignty between the states and the 
national government, and the separation of powers between the legisla-
tive, executive, and judicial branches of government.13 To this list one 
could add, by way of amendments quickly adopted by the first Congress 
and ratified by the states shortly thereafter, a written Bill of Rights.14 
 Most of these innovations in constitutional design have become 
commonplace; when other nations turn to the task of drafting a new 
constitution, the resulting product more often than not includes one or 
more of these elements.15 The Spanish Constitution, for example, 
adopted a federalist principle in order to overcome persistent difficul-
ties with the status of Catalunya and the Basque Region.16 The South 
                                                                                                                      
original thirteen colonies simply incorporated the right into local criminal procedure); see 
also Fabio Arcila, Jr., The Framers’ Search Power: The Misunderstood Statutory History of Suspicion 
& Probable Cause, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 363, 381, 382 (2009) (noting that the jury system origi-
nated in Great Britain and was exported to the United States); Randi Ellias, Should Courts 
Instruct Juries as to the Consequences to a Defendant of a “Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity” Verdict?, 
85 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1062, 1063 (1995) (noting that “[t]he modern jury finds its 
roots in eleventh century England, when courts initiated a practice of calling the defen-
dant’s neighbors to testify about various facts of the case at bar,” that “[t]he United States 
inherited the jury . . . from Great Britain,” and that “[a]fter the Revolutionary War, the 
Framers recognized the right to trial by jury as fundamental to the protection of individual 
liberty”). 
12 See U.S. Const. arts. I, § 1, II, § 1, III, § 1, IV, § 1, amends. I–X. 
13 Id. arts. I, § 1, II, § 1, III, § 1, IV, § 1. 
14 Id. amends. I–X. 
15 See Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 Ark. L. 
Rev. 23, 26 n.6 (1995) [hereinafter Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments] (arguing that “it is 
not an overstatement to say that the United States is perhaps the world’s leading exporter 
of concepts in public law”); Steven G. Calabresi, The Virtues of Presidential Government: Why 
Professor Ackerman Is Wrong to Prefer the German to the U.S. Constitution, 18 Const. Comment. 
51, 52–53 (2001) [hereinafter Calabresi, The Virtues of Presidential Government] (noting that 
U.S. constitutional innovations have proven popular in other nations engaged in constitu-
tion drafting and observing that “[t]he U.S. may run a balance of trade deficit in many 
areas, but when it comes to the war of ideas [in constitutional design] we are running a big 
surplus as exporters of public law”). 
16 See Constitución [C.E.] art. 2 (Spain); see also Charles E. Ehrlich, Ethno-cultural Mi-
norities and Federal Constitutionalism: Is Spain Instructive?, 24 S. Ill. U. L.J. 291, 292 (2000); 
Michel Rosenfeld, Constitution-Making, Identity Building, and Peaceful Transition to Democracy: 
Theoretical Reflections Inspired by the Spanish Example, 19 Cardozo L. Rev. 1891, 1912 (1998). 
See generally James Leonard, Title VII and the Protection of Minority Languages in the University 
Workplace: The Search for a Justification, 72 Mo. L. Rev. 745, 780–81 (2007) (discussing the 
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African Constitution vests the judiciary with a power of judicial review 
and a duty to enforce entrenched human rights against the more de-
mocratically accountable branches of government.17 Moreover, even 
common law jurisdictions that long maintained the principle of par-
liamentary supremacy have moved closer to the U.S. model of en-
trenched, judicially enforceable human rights.18 Canada, for example, 
adopted its Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982, and vested the 
Canadian judiciary with a qualified power of judicial review.19 Even in 
                                                                                                                      
preservation of sub-cultures in Spain by constituting “‘autonomous communities’ with co-
official languages for six regions, including the Catalonians and the Basques”). 
17 See S. Afr. Const. 1996 ch. 8, §§ 165(2), 167(5); see also id. ch. 2, § 39 (authorizing 
and requiring the domestic courts to “consider international law” and authorizing the 
domestic courts to consider “foreign law” when interpreting the South African Bill of 
Rights); Melissa A. Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of Transnational Judicial 
Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 93 Geo. L.J. 487, 562 (2005) (noting 
that “U.S. courts, unlike the South African Constitutional Court, do not have explicit con-
stitutional authorization to consider foreign and international sources” and suggesting 
that “[a]ccordingly, the South African court’s fairly aggressive approach to importing in-
ternational norms into domestic law may be inappropriate for U.S. courts”). 
18 See Judges in Contemporary Democracy: An International Conversation 3 
(Robert Badinter & Stephen Breyer eds., 2004). 
19 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, be-
ing Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11, § 24 (U.K.) (“Anyone whose rights or free-
doms, as guaranteed by this Charter, have been infringed or denied may apply to a court 
of competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court considers appropriate and 
just in the circumstances.”); Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 
1982, ch. 11, § 52 (U.K.) (vesting the Canadian courts with the power to enforce the Con-
stitution, including the power of judicial review); see R. v. Rahey, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 588 (Can.) 
(interpreting and applying Section 24(1)); Peter W. Hogg, Canada Act, 1982 Anno-
tated 64–66, 104–06 (1982) (discussing the expanded form of judicial review in Canada 
mandated by §§ 24(1) and 52(1) of the Charter and noting that “[t]he most important 
effect of s. 52(1) is that it now provides the basis for judicial review of legislation in Can-
ada”); Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada 206 (2003) [hereinafter Hogg, 
Constitutional Law of Canada (2003)]; Peter H. Russell, The Growth of Canadian Judi-
cial Review and the Commonwealth and American Experiences, in Comparative Judicial Re-
view and Public Policy 29, 33–34 (Donald W. Jackson & C. Neal Tate eds., 1992) (“With 
the adoption in 1982 of a constitutional Charter of Rights and Freedoms and a clause de-
claring ‘the Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada,’ the basis of judicial 
review has broadened to encompass a full sense of constitutionalism.”); see also Ronald J. 
Krotoszynski, Jr., The First Amendment in Cross-Cultural Perspective: A Com-
parative Legal Analysis 26–28, 38–39 (2006); Richard J. Moon, The Constitutional 
Protection of Freedom of Expression 219 (2000). Prior to 1982, the Supreme Court of 
Canada enjoyed a limited power of judicial review to enforce federalism principles that 
assigned discrete powers to the federal and provincial governments; no general power of 
judicial review to enforce fundamental rights existed and “the notion of parliamentary 
sovereignty [was] a pervasive element of Canadian constitutional law.” Peter W. Hogg, 
Constitutional Law of Canada 197–98 (1977) [hereinafter Hogg, Constitutional 
Law of Canada (1977)]; see id. at 429–30 (expressing sympathy for judicial enforcement 
and protection of fundamental human rights, such as the freedom of expression, but not-
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the United Kingdom itself, adoption of the Human Rights Act of 1998 
reflects a decision to adopt a junior varsity version of the U.S. model of 
entrenched, judicially enforceable human rights.20 
 Thus, the U.S. Constitution has provided a persuasive model for 
other nations engaged in the task of writing a constitution. Judicial re-
view and entrenched human rights are, if not a universal aspect of con-
stitutions adopted after World War II, quite nearly so.21 As Robert 
Badinter, former President of the French Conseil Constitutionnel, and 
Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court Stephen Breyer have aptly 
observed, “[t]oday almost all Western democracies have come to be-
lieve that independent judiciaries can help to protect fundamental 
human rights through judicial interpretation and application of written 
documents containing guarantees of individual freedom.”22 Thus, the 
U.S. constitutional model has proven to be a very successful legal ex-
port in many important respects.23 In two significant respects, however, 
                                                                                                                      
ing that “the central feature of the constitution of the United Kingdom, and of its Parlia-
ment, was in 1867, and still is, parliamentary sovereignty. . . . Thus, when the B.N.A. [Brit-
ish North America] Act established parliamentary institutions on the model of the United 
Kingdom, the plausible assumption would be, as the courts have so often emphasized, that 
the Canadian institutions would enjoy powers of the same order as those of the Parliament 
at Westminister”). Consequently, under the pre-Charter understanding of judicial review, 
Canadian judges “frequently asserted that the federal division of powers was the only con-
stitutional limitation on legislative power in Canada.” Russell, supra, at 33. This position is 
contemporaneously endorsed by Professor Hogg, the leading Canadian constitutional 
scholar of his generation. See Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (1977), supra, at 
198 (noting that, as of 1977, judicial review prior to the Charter was limited to enforce-
ment of federalism principles). As Professor Russell explains, “[t]he mutation from impe-
rialism to federalism to constitutionalism as the underlying rationale of judicial review in 
Canada is complete.” Russell, supra, at 34. 
20 See Krotoszynski, supra note 19, at 183–84. 
21 Australia and New Zealand provide instructive counter-examples—the exceptions that 
prove the general rule. Even in Australia, however, the federal courts have found that secur-
ing certain rights essential to the constitutional design, such as the freedom of speech inci-
dent to the electoral process, justifies a limited power of judicial review. See Lange v. Austra-
lian Broad. Corp. (1997) 189 C.L.R. 556 (Austl.); Australian Capital Tele. v. Commonwealth 
(1992) 177 C.L.R. 144 (Austl.); see also Arthur Glass, Australian Capital Television and the 
Application of Constitutional Rights, 17 Sydney L. Rev. 29, 29 (1995); Adrienne Stone, Austra-
lia’s Constitutional Rights and the Problem of Interpretive Disagreement, 27 Sydney L. Rev. 29, 34 
(2005). Israel’s constitution, which consists of constitutive acts adopted over many years, pro-
vides another counter-example. See United Mitzahi Bank v. Migdal Communal Vill., [1995] 
IsrSC 49 (4) 221, 49(4) P.D. 221 (Isr.); see also Aharon Barak, The Judge in a Democracy 
23-24 (2006); Daphne Barak-Erez, From an Unwritten to a Written Constitution: The Israeli Chal-
lenge in American Perspective, 26 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 309, 312–13 (1995). See generally 
Ran Hirsch, Israel’s “Constitutional Revolution”: The Legal Interpretation of Entrenched Civil Liberties 
in an Emerging Neo-Liberal Order, 46 Am. J. Comp. L. 421 (1998). 
22 Judges in Contemporary Democracy, supra note 18, at 3. 
23 See id. at 2–3. 
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the U.S. template has not garnered many takers: separation of legisla-
tive and executive powers, and strict judicial definition and enforce-
ment of the boundaries between legislative and executive power.24 
I. The Rigorous U.S. Commitment to the Separation of 
Executive and Legislative Powers 
 In the United States, a strong commitment to separating and divid-
ing legislative and executive power exists at the federal level as well as 
in most state constitutions.25 This separation of powers commitment 
appears front and center in recent opinions of the U.S. Supreme 
Court; the legislative history of the Constitution; and, perhaps most 
importantly, the text of the Constitution, which commands a strong 
form of separation of legislative and executive powers.26 This form of 
structural separation of powers is, if not unique, highly unusual, at least 
when viewed from a comparative law perspective.27 
                                                                                                                      
24 This is not to say that no other nations have adopted the U.S. model of separation of 
powers; counter-examples do exist. For example, Brazil’s current constitution creates a strong 
and independent president, and features separation of legislative and executive powers. See 
Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments, supra note 15, at 26 (“Countries as disparate as France, 
Russia, Brazil, Argentina, and Nigeria have all been inspired to adopt presidential forms of 
government at least in part because of the American experience.”); John Dinan, Patterns of 
Subnational Constitutionalism in Federal Countries, 39 Rutgers L.J. 837, 853–54 (2008) (observ-
ing that “[o]ne group of five federations—consisting of Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, the 
United States, and Venezuela—has presidential systems in both its national and subnational 
constitutions”); W. Gary Vause & Dulcina de Holanda Palhano, Labor Law in Brazil and the 
United States—Statism and Classical Liberalism Compared, 33 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 583, 590 
(1995) (noting that Brazil “launched a new government in a form resembling that of the 
United States” and also that although “the Constitution provided for a tripartite form of gov-
ernment with a rough balance of powers, it nevertheless had a strong presidential flavor”). 
With that said, however, presidential systems featuring the strong separation of legislative 
and executive powers incorporated into the U.S. Constitution are rare, numbering at less 
than three dozen nations worldwide. See Giovanni Sartori, Neither Presidentialism nor Parliamen-
tarianism, in 1 The Failure of Presidential Democracy 106, 107 ( Julian J. Linz & Arturo 
Valenzuela eds., 1994). 
25 See U.S. Const. arts. I, § 1, II, § 1, III, § 1; Dinan, supra note 24, at 854. 
26 See U.S. Const. arts. I, § 1, II, § 1, III, § 1; see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 
(1983); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 124 (1976). 
27 Although the exact number is difficult to pinpoint because of definitional difficulties 
in deciding what constitutes a truly “presidential” form of government, Professor Sartori 
counts only thirty nations that have adopted a presidential—as opposed to parliamentary— 
system of government. See Sartori, supra note 24, at 107. Moreover, presidential systems are 
“mostly concentrated in Latin America” and “the record of presidentially governed coun-
tries is—aside from the United States—quite dismal.” Id.; see also Bruce Ackerman, The New 
Separation of Powers, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 634, 646 (2000) (“There are about thirty countries, 
mostly in Latin America, that have adopted American-style systems. All of them, without 
exception, have succumbed to the Linzian nightmare [the collapse of constitutional gov-
ernment in favor of direct presidential or military control of the government] at one time 
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A. The U.S. Supreme Court and the Separation of Legislative  
and Executive Powers 
 The U.S. Supreme Court has rigorously enforced the separation of 
powers, disallowing a number of novel institutional innovations that the 
Congress and the President adopted in order to facilitate good govern-
ance.28 As Justice Powell observed in Buckley v. Valeo, decided in 1976, 
“[t]he principle of separation of powers was not simply an abstract gen-
eralization in the minds of the Framers: it was woven into the document 
that they drafted in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787.”29 Accordingly, 
“[t]he Framers regarded the checks and balances that they had built 
into the tripartite Federal Government as a self-executing safeguard 
against the encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the ex-
pense of the other.”30 Thus, as Professor Martin Redish and his co-
author Elizabeth Cisar perceptively have noted, “[a]lthough one may of 
course debate the scope or meaning of particular constitutional provi-
sions, it would be difficult to deny that in establishing their complex 
structure, the Framers were virtually obsessed with a fear—bordering on 
what some might uncharitably describe as paranoia—of the concentra-
tion of political power.”31 
                                                                                                                      
or another, often repeatedly.”). Far more nations have adopted and maintain a parliamen-
tary system of government, which lacks the separation of legislative and executive powers. 
But cf. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments, supra note 15, at 26, 27 (claiming counter-
factually that “presidential government has become (along with judicial review) one of the 
United States’ best-selling, and least remunerative exports” and arguing that “the recent 
global trend is toward presidentialism and separation of powers”). Indeed, several of Profes-
sor Calabresi’s own examples of the historic march of presidentialism, such as France and 
Russia, do not feature U.S.-style strict separation of legislative and executive powers. See id. at 
26. Indeed, in light of subsequent developments, citing Russia, where Prime Minister 
Vladimir Putin appears to be calling the shots, as a triumph of presidential control is deeply 
ironic. With respect to France, Professor Calabresi’s own prior work demonstrates how sig-
nificantly the French version of “presidentialism” departs from the U.S. approach. See Ste-
ven G. Calabresi & Joan L. Larsen, One Person, One Office: Separation of Powers or Separation of 
Personnel?, 79 Cornell L. Rev. 1045, 1091 (1994) (noting the structural weakness of the 
French President, describing the French system as a “hybrid presidential-parliamentary 
system,” and explaining that “[t]he French President is very weak, however, when there is 
divided party control of the Presidency and the National Assembly, and in those circum-
stances the regime becomes essentially a parliamentary one”). 
28 See Christopher F. Edley, Jr., Administrative Law: Rethinking Judicial Con-
trol of Bureaucracy 172, 173–74 (1990). 
29 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 124. 
30 Id. at 122. 
31 Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, “If Angels Were to Govern”: The Need for Prag-
matic Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 Duke L.J. 449, 451 (1991). 
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 The consistency of the Supreme Court’s efforts at enforcing sepa-
ration of powers principles is open to criticism, however. As Redish and 
Cisar note: 
In the separation of powers area, . . . the modern Court has 
evinced something of a split personality, seemingly wavering 
from resort to judicial enforcement with a formalistic venge-
ance to use of a so-called “functional” approach that appears 
to be designed to do little more than rationalize incursions by 
one branch of the federal government into the domain of an-
other.32 
That said, in policing the blending of legislative and executive func-
tions, the Supreme Court has been relatively strict in enforcing separa-
tion of powers limits, disallowing both encroachments on one branch 
by the other and attempts by one branch to aggrandize itself at the ex-
pense of the other.33 
 For example, in INS v. Chadha, decided in 1983, the U.S. Supreme 
Court invalidated the use of so-called legislative vetoes, a procedure 
whereby Congress delegates authority to the President, but reserves for 
itself, via a single house or a committee of a single house, the power to 
oversee, and even to disallow, the President’s use of this delegated au-
thority.34 Writing for the Chadha Court, Chief Justice Burger explained 
that in order to modify a law, a bill must be enacted by both houses of 
Congress and presented to the President for signature or veto; as the 
Court put the matter, “[t]hese provisions of Art[icle] I are integral 
parts of the constitutional design for the separation of powers.”35 Be-
cause Congress cannot execute laws and because bicameral action and 
presentment are necessary to modify an existing law (for example, to 
disallow the President’s use of previously delegated authority), a one-
house or one-committee “legislative veto” represents an unconstitu-
tional aggrandizement of Congress at the expense of the President.36 
                                                                                                                      
32 Id. at 450. 
33 Chadha, 462 U.S. at 959; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 123. 
34 See 462 U.S. at 959. 
35 See id. at 946. 
36 See id. at 958–59. Congress could delegate power to the President, with a duty to re-
port on how he exercises it, and provide for accelerated consideration of legislation disal-
lowing the President’s action—but such legislation would have to be enacted by both 
houses of Congress and presented to the President for a probable veto. See id. at 958. 
Moreover, Congress could require the President to wait for a prescribed period of time 
before implementing his plan. Thus, so-called “report and wait” provisions do not run 
afoul of Chadha’s rule against legislative vetoes. See id. at 935 n.9; see also Alaska Airlines v. 
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 Similarly, in 1986 the U.S. Supreme Court, in Bowsher v. Synar, in-
validated the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 
1985, also known as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, because it 
vested execution of the law with the Comptroller General, a govern-
ment officer only nominally appointed by the President (from a list de-
vised by Congress) and subject to removal by Congress without resort to 
impeachment.37 The Court explained that “[t]o permit an officer con-
trolled by Congress to execute the laws would be, in essence, to permit 
a congressional veto.”38 Because “[t]he structure of the Constitution 
does not permit Congress to execute the laws,” Chief Justice Burger 
concluded “that Congress cannot grant to an officer under its control 
what it does not possess.”39 
 Other major U.S. Supreme Court decisions involve strong efforts 
to enforce the structural separation of legislative and executive powers, 
including cases such as Buckley 40 and Clinton v. City of New York.41 Thus, 
                                                                                                                      
Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 689–90 (1987) (applying a “report and wait” provision of a federal 
statute and noting that the device “gives Congress an opportunity to review the regulations 
and either to attempt to influence the agency’s decision, or to enact legislation preventing 
the regulations from taking effect”); David A. Koplow, When Is an Amendment Not an 
Amendment?: Modifications of Arms Control Agreements Without the Senate, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
981, 1061 (1992) (noting that “report and wait” provisions do not raise the same constitu-
tional problems as legislative veto provisions). Since 1996, all “major” regulations have 
been subject to mandatory “report and wait” periods. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–808 (2006); see 
also Ed Rubin, It’s Time to Make the Administrative Procedure Act Administrative, 89 Cornell L. 
Rev. 95, 133–34 (2003) (advocating increased congressional oversight of federal agencies 
and suggesting that the generic comprehensive report and wait obligation for all major 
regulations provides a means of accomplishing this objective). 
37 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986). 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 424 U.S. at 143 (holding that Congress may not appoint members of a commission 
charged with enforcing the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended, because 
legislative appointment to an executive office does not comport with the Appointments 
Clause of Article II, § 2, cl. 2 of the U.S. Constitution); see also United States v. Germaine, 
99 U.S. 508, 510 (1879) (“That all persons who can be said to hold an office under the 
government about to be established under the Constitution were intended to be included 
within one or the other of these modes of appointment [direct appointment by the Presi-
dent with the advice and consent of the Senate or appointment of “inferior officers” by 
“the President alone, the Courts of Law, or the Heads of Departments”] there can be but 
little doubt.”). 
41 524 U.S. 417, 436, 438 (1998) (invalidating the Line Item Veto Act, a statutory effort 
to vest the President with the power to cancel “any dollar amount of discretionary budget 
authority,” “any new item of direct spending,” or “any limited tax benefit” after having 
signed the law authorizing the appropriation or creating the limited tax benefit because 
only Congress can repeal a statute once it has been enacted, and by the exercise of a line 
item veto “[i]n both legal and practical effect, the President has amended two Acts of 
Congress by repealing a portion of each”). 
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the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected efforts to blend legislative 
and executive powers in novel ways, even if Congress and the President 
mutually agreed to such power sharing, and even if concrete benefits 
might be associated with the novel power sharing arrangements.42 In-
deed “[i]t is more than a little ironic that the Supreme Court has de-
ployed formalist reasoning to strike down novel power-sharing ar-
rangements between Congress and the President, but has relied on 
functional reasoning to permit the transfer of legislative and executive 
duties to Article III personnel.”43 
 One should be careful, of course, not to overstate the point; con-
trary evidence and trends exist and must be acknowledged. For ex-
ample, the Supreme Court has largely abandoned efforts to enforce 
the nondelegation doctrine,44 which purportedly limits the scope of 
delegated authority that Congress may grant to the executive 
branch.45 In theory, unless Congress provides an “intelligible princi-
ple” that limits the scope of delegated authority, the delegation vio-
lates the separation of powers by vesting the President with core legis-
lative powers;46 in practice, however, virtually any statutory mandate 
that Congress enacts meets the “intelligible principle” standard.47 
Were the Supreme Court to enforce the separation of powers doctrine 
as aggressively in this context as in the legislative veto and appoint-
ments cases, far more federal laws would be invalidated for violating 
the nondelegation doctrine. Thus, the Supreme Court’s efforts to en-
force the separation of legislative and executive powers are not all-
encompassing or unyielding.48 Even with this caveat, however, the fact 
remains that the Supreme Court has not simply left Congress and the 
President free to referee the appropriate metes and bounds of their 
respective institutional authority.49 
                                                                                                                      
42 See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., On the Danger of Wearing Two Hats: Mistretta and Mor-
rison Revisited, 38 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 417, 476, 477, 478, 479–80 (1997) (arguing that the 
federal courts should be vigilant in policing efforts to engage judges in legislative or ex-
ecutive tasks, but also noting that the federal courts have in practice been much more 
aggressive at enforcing the separation of powers in the context of novel power sharing 
arrangements between the legislative and executive branches). 
43 Id. at 480. 
44 See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Reconsidering the Nondelegation Doctrine: Universal Ser-
vice, the Power to Tax, and the Ratification Doctrine, 80 Ind. L.J. 239, 264–65 (2005). 
45 See id. at 261. 
46 See id. at 260. 
47 See id. at 264–65. 
48 See Redish & Cisar, supra note 31, at 450. 
49 See id. 
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B. The Original Understanding and the Separation of Legislative  
and Executive Powers 
 It would be easy to assume that the contemporary commitment to 
formalism in enforcing the separation of powers is a modern innova-
tion; such an assumption would not be warranted. To be sure, the struc-
tural separation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers into three 
distinct branches does not, of its own force, preclude the voluntary re-
distribution of such powers among and between the branches going 
forward.50 The Federalist Papers, however, seem to confirm the view that 
the initial allocation of powers between the three branches was meant to 
be more than simply an initial starting point.51 
 In Federalist No. 47, James Madison emphasized the importance of 
establishing and maintaining the separation of powers: 
The reasons on which Montesquieu grounds his maxim are a 
further demonstration of his meaning. “When the legislative 
and executive powers are united in the same person or body,” 
says he, “there can be no liberty, because apprehensions may 
arise lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical 
laws to execute them in a tyrannical manner.” Again: “Were the 
power of judging joined with the legislative, the life and lib-
erty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control, for 
the judge would then be the legislator. Were it joined to the ex-
ecutive power, the judge might behave with all the violence of 
an oppressor.” Some of these reasons are more fully explained 
in other passages; but briefly stated as they are here they suffi-
ciently establish the meaning which we have put on this cele-
brated maxim of this celebrated author.52 
                                                                                                                      
50 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a 
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representa-
tives.”); id. art. II, § 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United 
States of America.”); id. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be 
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as Congress may from time to 
time ordain and establish.”). Indeed, James Madison feared the possibility of a redistribu-
tion of governmental powers so greatly that he proposed a constitutional amendment that 
would prevent the voluntary reassignment of duties among and between the branches of 
the federal government. See 1 The Debates and Proceedings of the Congress of the 
United States 435–36 ( Joseph A. Gales & W.W. Seaton eds., 1834) ( June 8, 1789) [here-
inafter Debates and Proceedings]. 
51 The Federalist No. 47, supra note 3, at 300–01. 
52 Id. at 303. 
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Thus, for Madison, the division of legislative and executive power rep-
resented an essential bulwark against tyranny.53 And, in turn, the Fram-
ers carefully separated and divided legislative and executive power, 
placing legislative power in the hands of Congress and executive power 
squarely in the hands of the President.54 
 Madison’s concerns with the risk of tyranny did not cease with rati-
fication of the Constitution in 1788.55 Although largely forgotten, one 
of Madison’s proposed amendments to the Constitution, included in 
the package of proposed amendments that later became the Bill of 
Rights, was a proposed amendment that would have reiterated the ir-
revocable nature of the separation of powers: 
The powers delegated by this Constitution are appropriated 
to the departments to which they are respectively distributed: 
so that the Legislative Department shall never exercise the 
powers vested in the Executive or Judicial, nor the Executive 
exercise the powers vested in the Legislative or Judicial, nor 
the Judicial exercise the powers vested in the Legislative or 
Executive Departments.56 
Had this amendment been adopted, this new provision would have 
been largely redundant with the existing vesting clauses in Article I, § 1, 
which vests “all legislative Powers herein granted” in the Congress, Arti-
cle II, § 1, which vests “[t]he executive Power” in the President, and 
Article III, § 1, which vests “[t]he judicial Power of the United States” in 
the Supreme Court and the inferior federal courts (should Congress 
choose to create them).57 Madison defended the amendment as neces-
sary in order to ensure that the powers of the federal government 
would remain “separate and distinct” and argued that the vesting 
clauses were an insufficient safeguard.58 
 Thus, even though the Framers, including Madison, had carefully 
and expressly made the vesting of clearly separated legislative, execu-
                                                                                                                      
53 See The Federalist No. 48, at 308, 310 ( James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961); see also The Federalist No. 49, at 315–16 ( James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961) (“We have seen that the tendency of republican governments is to aggrandizement 
of the legislative at the expense of the other departments.”). 
54 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 120 (noting that “the Constitution was nonetheless true to 
Montesquieu’s well-known maxim that the legislative, executive, and judicial departments 
ought to be separate and distinct”). 
55 See Debates and Proceedings, supra note 50, at 435–36. 
56 Id. 
57 U.S. Const. arts. I, § 1, II, § 1, III, § 1. 
58 Debates and Proceedings, supra note 50, at 760. 
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tive, and judicial power the very first provision of each article constitut-
ing a particular branch of the federal government, Madison neverthe-
less feared the reunification of these powers through voluntary, or per-
haps even involuntary, transfers of power among the branches of the 
federal government.59 Accordingly, Madison sought to establish a tex-
tual prohibition against any branch, through whatever means, exercis-
ing the powers vested in the other two branches of the federal govern-
ment.60 The House of Representatives actually adopted the proposed 
amendment by the requisite two-thirds vote, but the Senate, for reasons 
lost to history, declined to adopt this amendment.61 
 Professor Bob Pushaw posits that “[t]he First Congress’s rejection 
of an explicit constitutional provision requiring separation of powers 
reflects a desire to maintain flexibility in blending certain governmen-
tal functions.”62 Similarly, Professor Bernard Schwartz concludes from 
the failure of the separation of powers amendment in the Senate that 
“[w]hatever separation of powers may be provided for [in the Constitu-
tion], it does not compel a bright line separation between the depart-
ments, with each of them expressly prohibited from exercising any 
power appropriate to one of the others.”63 Although these are certainly 
plausible lessons to be drawn from the Senate’s decision to reject the 
separation of powers amendment, in the absence of any legislative re-
cord of the Senate debates, it ultimately is impossible to know precisely 
why the amendment failed. Moreover, to say that Congress rejected a 
complete and unyielding separation of powers does not answer the 
point that the Framers established a structure that broke quite dra-
matically with the British parliamentary model by dividing and separat-
ing legislative, executive, and judicial responsibilities.64 
 For many of the Framers, including James Madison, the aim was to 
divide power in hopes of better controlling it.65 In particular, the Fram-
ers believed that rather than relying on a perpetual supply of virtuous 
                                                                                                                      
59 See id. at 435–36. 
60 Id. 
61 See 2 The Bill of Rights: A Documentary History 1123, 1150 (Bernard Schwartz 
ed., 1971). For a concise history of the legislative debate of Madison’s proposal in the 
House of Representatives, see Bernard Schwartz, Curiouser and Curiouser: The Supreme 
Court’s Separation of Powers Wonderland, 65 Notre Dame L. Rev. 587, 589–90 (1990). 
62 Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 
Cornell L. Rev. 393, 428 n.161 (1996). 
63 Schwartz, supra note 61, at 590. 
64 But cf. id. (“The legislative history just summarized leads to the conclusion that a 
strict separation of powers, such as that in the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights of 1780, 
was deliberately rejected at the outset.”). 
65 See Debates and Proceedings, supra note 50, at 435–36. 
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and wise rulers (a commodity that the Framers knew to be in very short 
supply and which history suggested could be something of a null set), 
the better course was to create a carefully calibrated system of govern-
ment that would create strong institutional incentives to resist en-
croachments against one branch by the other branches of the federal 
government.66 Madison viewed this idea broadly, noting: 
We see [this principle] particularly displayed in all the subor-
dinate distributions of power, where the constant aim is to di-
vide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that 
each may be a check on the other—that the private interest of 
every individual may be a sentinel over the public rights.67 
 The Framers’ thinking on these questions was undoubtedly influ-
enced significantly by the writings of Enlightenment political philoso-
phers who strongly advocated the separation of legislative, executive, 
and judicial powers, such as John Locke and Montesquieu.68 As Madi-
son noted in Federalist No. 47, “[t]he oracle who is always consulted and 
cited on this subject [the separation of powers] is the celebrated Mon-
tesquieu.”69 Thus, even if existing British constitutional arrangements 
did not incorporate the separation of powers,70 the Framers certainly 
would have been familiar with the concept and the arguments in favor 
of structuring government institutions to incorporate it.71 The Framers’ 
innovation was not so much the creation or articulation of the concept, 
but rather a strong commitment to implementing the principle in the 
Constitution.72 
                                                                                                                      
66 See The Federalist No. 51, at 321–22 ( James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961); see also Redish & Cisar, supra note 31, at 505. 
67 See The Federalist No. 51, supra note 66, at 322. 
68 John Locke, Two Treatises on Government, The Second Treatise of Govern-
ment, §§ 147–48 (Ian Shapiro ed., 2003) (1690); Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, 
bk. XI, ch. 6, ¶¶ 1–2, 60–62 (Thomas Nugent trans., 1991) (1748); see Redish & Cisar, supra 
note 31, at 457. 
69 The Federalist No. 47, supra note 3, at 301. 
70 The United Kingdom, then and now, maintains a “balance of powers” rather than a 
“separation of powers.” See Hyre, supra note 8, at 432; see also Michael Skold, Note, The 
Reform Act’s Supreme Court: A Missed Opportunity for Judicial Review in the United Kindgom?, 39 
Conn. L. Rev. 2149, 2154 (2007) (“In contrast to the American system based on a clear 
separation of powers and effective checks and balances, the British system traditionally has 
fused the three branches of government together, creating more of a balance of powers 
than a separation.”). 
71 See Redish & Cisar, supra note 31, at 458. 
72 See M.J.C. Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers 58 (1967); see 
also Redish & Cisar, supra note 31, at 458; John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other 
Means: The Original Understanding of the War Powers, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 167, 199 (1996). 
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C. The Constitutional Text and the Separation of Legislative  
and Executive Powers 
 The U.S. Supreme Court has not pursued a commitment to the 
separation of legislative and executive powers based solely on its con-
cerns or those of the Framers.73 Instead, the text of the Constitution itself 
contains a strong wall of separation between the legislative and executive 
branches: the Incompatibility Clause.74 The Incompatibility Clause pro-
vides that: 
No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for 
which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under 
the Authority of the United States, which shall have been cre-
ated, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased 
during such time; and no Person holding any Office under the 
United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continu-
ance in Office.75 
The Incompatibility Clause effectively prevents a sitting member of the 
House or Senate from serving as a cabinet secretary without resigning 
her seat in Congress.76 Of course, members of Congress have served— 
and do serve—in the executive branch after resigning from Congress 
before receiving a formal appointment to an executive branch office.77 
                                                                                                                      
73 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 6, cl. 2. 
74 See id. 
75 Id. (emphasis added). 
76 See Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 904 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The Fram-
ers’ experience with postrevolutionary self-government had taught them that combining 
the power to create offices with the power to appoint officers was a recipe for legislative 
corruption. The foremost danger was that legislators would create offices with the expec-
tancy of occupying them themselves. This was guarded against by the Incompatibility and 
Ineligibility Clauses, Article I, § 6, cl. 2.”). Even so, however, the Supreme Court has as-
siduously avoided deciding whether the Incompatibility Clause prohibits sitting members 
of Congress from holding military commissions in the armed forces reserves, holding that 
taxpayers lack standing to sue to enforce the Incompatibility Clause. See Schlesinger v. Re-
servists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 220–21, 228 (1974). Accordingly, the judici-
ary’s efforts to enforce the Incompatibility Clause have, in practice, been somewhat less 
than strict or vigilant. 
77 See Calabresi & Larsen, supra note 27, at 1078–79, 1081–84 (discussing presidential 
appointments of sitting members of Congress to executive branch posts and also noting 
the consistent related practice of appointing spouses and family members of sitting mem-
bers of Congress, as well as former members of Congress, to positions within the executive 
branch). In fact, Congress had to reduce the salary paid to the Secretary of State, which 
had been increased within the past two years, so that Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton 
could be appointed to this position; without the reduction of the salary, the Ineligibility 
Clause would have prevented Senator Clinton from appointment to this post until her 
second term ended in 2013. See Law Forces Congress to Reduce a Salary, Boston Globe, Dec. 
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 James Madison, one of the principal architects of the Constitution, 
firmly believed that legislative service in the executive branch was not 
merely a prescription for legislative featherbedding, but also an af-
firmatively dangerous practice.78 Writing on the subject to Thomas Jef-
ferson, Madison observed that: 
The power of the Legislature to appoint any other than their 
own officers departs too far from the Theory which requires a 
separation of the great Departments of Government. One of 
the best securities against the creation of unnecessary offices or 
tyrannical powers is an exclusion of the authors from all share 
in filling the one, or influence in the execution of the other.79 
Thus, the rationales for the Incompatibility and Ineligibility Clauses are 
both highly practical (in the absence of such a clause the legislature will 
create unnecessary sinecures for its members at the public’s expense) 
and highly theoretical (merger of the legislative and executive powers is 
conducive to “tyranny,” even if bad results do not actually occur).80 
                                                                                                                      
12, 2008, at A16 (reporting that Congress reduced the Secretary of State’s salary by $4,700, 
from $191,300 to $186,600, its level in January 2007, when Senator Clinton began her 
second term in the Senate, in order “to keep Clinton’s nomination from running afoul of 
the Constitution, which includes a section that says no member of Congress can be ap-
pointed to a government post if that job’s pay was increased during the lawmaker’s current 
term”). Reducing the salary of an executive branch office has been used to avoid the In-
eligibility Clause at least twice before in recent history: both President Clinton’s appoint-
ment of Senator Lloyd Bentsen, as Secretary of the Treasury, in 1993, and President 
Nixon’s appointment of Senator William Saxbe, as Attorney General, in 1974, required an 
identical legislative fix. See Ali T. Winston, Editorial, The Anti-Clinton Vendetta, Star-Ledger 
(N.J.), Dec. 6, 2008, at A10. 
78 See James Madison, Madison’s Observations on Jefferson’s Draft of a Constitu-
tion for Virginia, reprinted in 6 Papers of Thomas Jefferson 308, 311 ( J. Boyd ed., 1952). 
79 Id. 
80 Id. Interestingly, no formal bar exists on judicial personnel serving in the executive 
branch and, from time to time, federal judges have served in the executive branch concur-
rently with their Article III judicial service. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 397, 
398 (1989); see also Calabresi & Larsen, supra note 27, at 1131–46 (describing historical 
examples of joint service); Krotoszynski, supra note 42, at 462–68 (canvassing historical 
examples of joint service, as well as refusals by Article III judges to undertake extra-judicial 
duties within the executive branch). Even so, a de facto constitutional custom against such 
joint service has developed. As Professors Calabresi and Larsen put the matter, “it is fair to 
say that a tradition has evolved that very nearly replicates the situation that would exist if 
[the Constitution contained] a judicial-executive incompatibility clause.” Calabresi & Lar-
sen, supra note 27, at 1139. On the other hand, neither the Constitution nor the contem-
porary practices of the Framers establish any prohibition on joint federal/state office-
holding, meaning that a member of Congress is free to serve in a state government post 
concurrently with her federal service. See Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the 
Abatement of Aircraft Noise, 501 U.S. 252, 282 (1991) (White, J., dissenting). That said, a 
strong—and largely unbroken—tradition of “one person, one office” exists in this context 
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 The Constitution itself thus prevents the adoption of the common 
practice in parliamentary democracies of staffing senior executive 
branch posts with sitting legislators.81 The Framers constructed, and 
“We the People” ratified, a document that squarely rejects a very com-
mon institutional design that marries legislative expertise with respon-
sibility for oversight over an executive department.82 In the United 
States, those drafting the Constitution perceived the division of legisla-
tive and executive power to be an essential component of a just gov-
ernment, an imperative no less pressing than a written constitution, the 
creation of an independent judiciary with the power of judicial review, 
and the retention of states as a kind of vertical federalism check on pos-
sible overreaching by the central government.83 
                                                                                                                      
as well. See Calabresi & Larsen, supra note 27, at 1151. Thus, “[t]oday, it seems almost uni-
maginable for one individual simultaneously to hold salaried, full-time federal and state 
offices.” Id. 
81 See Jackson & Tushnet, supra note 7, at 710. 
82 See generally Ackerman, supra note 27, at 642–56, 688–90 (explaining the benefits of 
such institutional arrangements). Professor Ackerman describes his position on the merits 
of parliamentary forms of government as “reject[ing] Westminister as well as Washington 
as my guide and proffer[ing] the model of constrained parliamentarianism as the most 
promising framework for future development of the separation of powers.” Id. at 640. In 
particular, he commends the German constitution, or Basic Law (Grundgesetz), as a suitable 
working model. See id. at 670–71. But cf. Calabresi, The Virtues of Presidential Government, 
supra note 15, at 52, 54 (noting that “Bruce Ackerman is also now the most outspoken 
proponent of the superiority of German style parliamentary government to our American 
system” and arguing that “Professor Ackerman’s preference for German style constrained 
parliamentary government is misplaced”). 
83 On the last point, the Second Amendment is quite instructive. The Second Amend-
ment provides that “[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, 
the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. Const. amend. 
II; see District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2821–22 (2008) (holding that the Sec-
ond Amendment creates an individual, personal right to keep and bear arms, at least as 
against the federal government). Anti-Federalist leaders, like Thomas Jefferson, feared that 
the central government possessed too much power and would, by force of arms if necessary, 
expand its power at the expense of the states. Akhil Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 
100 Yale L.J. 1131, 1163 (1991); Kevin J. Worthen, The Right to Keep and Bear Arms in Light of 
Thornton: The People and Essential Attributes of Sovereignty, 1998 BYU L. Rev. 137, 143–44. In 
their view, the states would have to possess, quite literally, a military check on the federal 
government in order to keep the federal government from disregarding constitutional limi-
tations on the scope of its power. See David Thomas Konig, Thomas Jefferson’s Armed Citizenry 
and the Republican Militia, 1 Alb. Gov’t L. Rev. 250, 281 (2008); Andrew M. Wayment, Com-
ment, The Second Amendment: A Guard for Our Future Security, 37 Idaho L. Rev. 203, 231 
(2000); see also Gary Wills, A Necessary Evil: A History of American Distrust of Gov-
ernment 25 (1999) (discussing modern militia movements “training for guerilla war against 
the federal government” and the claim that “gun owners in general could successfully defeat 
tyrannical measures taken by the government”). Although Professor Wills questions many of 
the historical claims advanced by the modern militia movement, he cheerfully acknowledges 
that their central contemporary argument is the notion that an armed populace may, by 
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 At the Federal Convention, the Incompatibility Clause did not re-
ceive much, if any debate.84 Instead, debate among the delegates fo-
cused exclusively on the scope of the Ineligibility Clause, which flatly 
bars members of Congress from appointment to certain executive or 
judicial offices.85 The Committee of Eleven proposed a complete ineli-
gibility for members of Congress to any federal office during the period 
for which a member was elected to Congress (meaning a six year bar 
for newly elected members of the Senate).86 The delegates weakened 
the Committee of Eleven’s draft of the Ineligibility Clause to prohibit 
appointment only to newly created offices, but not to offices that ex-
isted prior to the election of a member of the House or Senate, and to 
any office for which the current Congress had increased the salary.87 It 
bears noting that some delegates, such as Elbridge Gerry of Massachu-
setts, strenuously argued for a complete and total ineligibility barring 
members of Congress from appointment to executive or judicial fed-
eral offices during their terms of office.88 
 Moreover, one also should note that some of the delegates plainly 
recognized that the Incompatibility and Ineligibility Clauses repre-
sented a stark break with existing separation of powers practices in other 
nations.89 Nathaniel Gorham, of Massachusetts, strongly supported 
weakening the Ineligibility Clause because without such amendment 
“we go further than has been done in any of the States, or indeed any 
other Country.”90 Significantly, however, no delegate argued in favor of 
permitting a sitting member of the House or Senate also to serve in an 
executive or judicial office; the debate focused solely on how broadly to 
                                                                                                                      
force of arms, defend against government tyranny. See Wills, supra, at 25–41. Indeed, “[t]he 
glorification of militias reached such a pitch that Akhil Reed Amar, Southmayd Professor at 
the Yale Law School, collaborated with a journalist on a book proclaiming that the right to 
serve in a militia was one of the three most fundamental guarantors of constitutional free-
doms.” Id. at 27. See generally Akhil Reed Amar & Alan Hirsch, For the People: What the 
Constitution Really Says About Your Rights (1998). 
84 See James Madison, Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787, at 
571–73 (Adrienne Koch ed., 1965). 
85 See id. 
86 The draft provided that “[t]he members of each House shall be ineligible to any 
civil office under the authority of the U.S. during the time for which they shall respectively 
be elected, and no person holding an office under the U.S. shall be a member of either 
House during his continuance in office.” Id. at 569. 
87 Id. at 573. 
88 Id. at 572 (“Mr. Gerry thought the eligibility of members would have the effect of 
opening batteries agst [sic] good officers, in order to drive them out & make way for mem-
bers of the Legislature.”). 
89 Id. 
90 Madison, supra note 84, at 572. 
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write the proscription against appointment of incumbent members of 
Congress to newly created federal offices or to existing offices with re-
cent salary enhancements.91 
 Given the strength of the Framers’ concerns about the danger of 
mixing executive and legislative functions, and the salience of these 
concerns up to the present day, at least in the pages of the U.S. Reports, 
one would think that the concern would have found some measure of 
traction in other nations.92 To state the matter simply, if merging legis-
lative and executive functions is conducive to tyranny, one would pre-
dict that persons drafting new constitutions would assiduously avoid 
merging legislative and executive powers.93 This has not, however, 
proven to be the case.94 
II. The Rejection of Legislative/Executive Separation of 
Powers in the Larger World 
 For a concept of such sweeping importance to the Framers and, 
more recently, to the Supreme Court, the utter absence of concern in 
most other democracies about placing legislative and executive func-
tions in the same hands should come as something of a surprise to per-
sons steeped in the U.S. constitutional tradition.95 If dividing and sepa-
rating legislative and executive power really represents an essential 
attribute of a well-ordered government, most national governments in 
the larger world come up short.96 
 Although certain aspects of the U.S. constitutional system, such as 
a written constitution including a bill of rights, judicial review by an in-
dependent judiciary, and federalism, have all proven to be wildly suc-
cessful legal exports, the U.S. model of strict formalist separation of 
legislative and executive powers simply has not.97 Moreover, the rejec-
tion of concerns over separation of legislative and executive powers 
completely bridges the common law and civil law world; both common 
                                                                                                                      
91 Id. at 571–72. 
92 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 124; Madison, supra note 84, at 571–72. 
93 Cf. Redish & Cisar, supra note 31, at 505. 
94 See infra notes 95–113 and accompanying text. 
95 As Professor Ackerman wryly asks, “[g]iven the British success in avoiding the inexo-
rable slide into tyranny predicted by Madison and Montesquieu, perhaps we should give 
up on the very idea of separation of powers?” Ackerman, supra note 27, at 640. 
96 Cf. Sartori, supra note 24, at 106–07. 
97 See id. Again, it bears noting that only about thirty nations have adopted presidential 
systems, rather than parliamentary or “mixed” presidential systems, both of which typically 
lack a structural separation of executive and legislative powers that prohibits vesting both 
powers in the same hands. See id. at 107. 
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law and civil law jurisdictions feature parliamentary systems of govern-
ment in which the highest executive officers also serve as sitting mem-
bers of the national legislature.98 Indeed, these arrangements do not 
seem particularly bothersome to persons, including lawyers and legal 
academics, living in these nations.99 
 Accordingly, in the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia, all 
common law jurisdictions, the national parliament also selects the prin-
cipal executive officers, usually drawn from within its own ranks.100 
Cabinet level ministers are invariably incumbent members of the legis-
lature.101 To be sure, an independent “executive branch” exists that fea-
tures lower level bureaucrats who work entirely independently of the 
national legislature.102 Thus, even in parliamentary democracies using 
the common law, a weak form of separation of powers works below the 
highest offices within the ministries.103 The fact remains, however, that 
persons with substantial responsibility for writing and revising the laws 
also enjoy principal responsibility for enforcing the laws as well.104 
 Civil law nations like France, Germany, and Japan also feature con-
stitutional arrangements that tend to blend, rather than strictly sepa-
rate, legislative and executive power.105 France is instructive in this re-
gard because the President enjoys some measure of lawmaking 
authority—in this sense, then, the executive branch enjoys the power to 
legislate, at least with respect to certain subject matter.106 But, even in 
France, the Prime Minister, selected from the majority party in the leg-
islature, retains significant responsibility for the implementation of 
government policies107 and difficulties can arise when a President of 
                                                                                                                      
98 See Jackson & Tushnet, supra note 7, at 710–11. See generally John Henry Merryman 
& Rogelio Pérez Perdomo, The Civil Law Tradition: An Introduction to the Legal 
Systems of Europe and Latin America 20–24 (3d ed. 2007) (explaining the development 
of common law and civil law). 
99 Cf. Jackson & Tushnet, supra note 7, at 710–11. 
100 See id. at 362 (describing the British parliamentary system, which has also been 
adopted by Australia and Canada). 
101 See id. 
102 Cf. David P. Currie, The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany 
173 (1994). 
103 Cf. id. 
104 See Jackson & Tushnet, supra note 7, at 362. 
105 See 1958 Const. 34 (Fr.); Kenpō [Constitution] arts. 67–69 ( Japan); Currie, supra 
note 102, at 136, 173. 
106 1958 Const. 10–11, 37 (Fr.); see Jackson & Tushnet, supra note 7, at 499–500, 711–
12. 
107 1958 Const. 21 (Fr.) (“The Prime Minister shall direct the actions of the Govern-
ment. He shall be responsible for national defence. He shall ensure implementation of 
legislation.”). Interestingly, however, the French Constitution also contains an incompati-
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one party is forced to work with a Prime Minister drawn from the oppo-
sition party’s ranks.108 And, in Germany, the Chancellor is also a mem-
ber of the federal parliament, as are virtually all of the heads of the 
various executive departments.109 The same holds true in Japan.110 As 
in most common law nations, the notion that legislative service is in-
compatible with executive service simply does not seem to register as an 
important structural constitutional consideration.111 
 The question that demands to be asked and answered, obviously 
enough, is: why do other nations find the conflation of legislative and 
executive policy making power to be entirely unproblematic? The 
Framers of the U.S. Constitution, and contemporary federal judges, 
appear to view the merging of legislative and executive powers as creat-
ing a potentially dangerous concentration of power.112 From the per-
                                                                                                                      
bility clause, Article 23, which provides that “[m]embership of the Government shall be 
incompatible with the holding of any Parliamentary office, any position of professional 
representation at national level, any public employment or professional activity.” 1958 
Const. 23 (Fr.); see John Bell, French Constitutional Law 17 (1992) (“Article 23 cre-
ates an incompatibility between being a minister and being a member of Parliament, with 
the result that ministers need have no parliamentary experience.”). 
108 See Bell, supra note 107, at 59–60; see also Ackerman, supra note 27, at 648–49 (dis-
cussing the requirement that the French Prime Minster “has majority support in the Na-
tional Assembly,” noting that presidential authority is greatly diminished during periods of 
“cohabitation,” and concluding that “[w]hen judged by American standards, French sepa-
ration [of legislative and executive powers] seems relatively weak”). Calabresi and Larsen 
are highly critical of this aspect of the French constitution, particularly in periods of so-
called “cohabitation,” when the President and Prime Minister belong to different political 
parties and have little incentive to cooperate with each other: “[During periods of ‘cohabi-
tation’ a] figurehead President presides over a parliamentary regime in which most real 
power is exercised by a Prime Minister and Parliament in the hands of the opposition 
party.” Calabresi & Larsen, supra note 27, at 1092. But cf. Calabresi, Some Normative Argu-
ments, supra note 15, at 26 (citing France as having adopted a presidential system of gov-
ernment); Calabresi, The Virtues of Presidential Government, supra note 15, at 53 (same). 
109 See Currie, supra note 102, at 139. 
110 See Kenpō [Constitution] arts. 67–68 ( Japan); see also Ackerman, supra note 27, at 635 
(discussing the relationship of the Prime Minister and other executive offices to the Diet). See 
generally J.A.A. Stockwin et al., Dynamic and Immobilist Politics in Japan (1988); J.A.A. 
Stockwin, Governing Japan: Divided Politics in a Resurgent Economy (4th ed. 2008); 
J.A.A. Stockwin, The Need for Reform in Japanese Politics, in The Vitality of Japan: Sources of 
National Strength and Weakness 91–111 (Armand Clesse et al. eds., 1997). 
111 See Currie, supra note 102, at 172 (“A parliamentary system, which Germany shares 
with most other successful democracies, necessarily entails a sacrifice of separation to bet-
ter coordination of official policy and more effective safeguards against the abuse of ex-
ecutive authority.”). With respect to the latter point—avoiding abuse of executive author-
ity—the matter could be framed in favor of separation of powers, i.e., an independent 
legislative branch would seem to have more power, and more incentive, to ferret out 
wrongdoing than a majority party would possess in embarrassing the party’s leader (viz., 
the prime minister or chancellor). See The Federalist No. 47, supra note 3, at 301. 
112 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 123 (1976); Madison, supra note 84, at 571–72. 
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spective of the rest of the world, such dual roles provoke yawns rather 
than dire predictions of “tyranny.”113 
III. Explaining U.S. Separation of Powers Exceptionalism 
 The foregoing considerations raise some interesting, important, 
and difficult questions about precisely why the United States has 
adopted a strong separation of legislative and executive powers. Why 
                                                                                                                      
113 See Redish & Cisar, supra note 31, at 463–64. Interestingly, Professor Steven Calabresi 
has repeatedly asserted that presidentialism has been gaining global traction in the last 
twenty or so years. See Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments, supra note 15, at 26–27; Calabresi, 
The Virtues of Presidential Government, supra note 15, at 53. As he puts it, “the recent global 
trend is toward presidentialism and separation of powers.” Calabresi, Some Normative Argu-
ments, supra note 15, at 26–27. With respect, I must disagree with this claim. First, many of 
the systems that he cites, such as France and Russia, simply do not observe the same struc-
tural separation of powers that exists in the United States, i.e., effective presidential con-
trol over senior executive officers can be highly attenuated (if not non-existent) in these 
national governments. See Calabresi & Larsen, supra note 27, at 1091. These formal struc-
tural objections arise even before one considers the necessity of looking at the de facto 
relationship between the President and Prime Minister in a mixed presidential system; for 
example, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin wields more de facto executive authority than the 
incumbent president, Dmitry Medvedev, whom Putin hand-picked for that office. See 
Robert Blitt, “Babushka Said Two Things—It Will Either Rain or Snow; It Either Will or Will Not”: 
An Analysis of the Provisions and Human Rights Implications of Russia’s New Law on Non-
Governmental Organizations as Told Through Eleven Russian Proverbs, 40 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. 
Rev. 1, 82 n.436 (2008) (noting that Putin will continue to establish Russian policies from 
the newly enhanced and empowered office of Prime Minister). True presidential sys-
tems—excluding presidential dictatorships, such as those found in places like Egypt or 
Syria—that feature both a strong central magistrate and a functioning democratically 
elected legislature are a genuine rarity. See generally Sartori, supra note 24. What’s more, the 
point of comparison should not be post-1989 (emergence of post-Soviet states after the fall 
of the Iron Curtain), nor post-1945 (emergence of post-colonial states after the defeat of 
fascism), but rather June 21, 1788 (the date that New Hampshire became the ninth state to 
ratify the Constitution of 1787, and the date on which that document went into force) and 
the present. Viewed over a period of more than 200 years, parliamentary systems and 
mixed presidential systems, both lacking strong forms of separation of legislative and ex-
ecutive powers, are the global norm, not the exception. And, even in those polities that 
have adopted presidential systems featuring structural separation of powers, the track re-
cord of success is very poor. See Ackerman, supra note 27, at 646, 647 (noting that presi-
dential systems have failed consistently in Latin America and suggesting that the structural 
problems with this model make this track record unsurprising); Calabresi, The Virtues of 
Presidential Government, supra note 15, at 95 (“The damaging fact here is that every single 
Latin American presidential regime has suffered at least one democratic breakdown dur-
ing the course of its history.”). Moreover, nations that have existing parliamentary systems 
that predate the fall of the Iron Curtain, including most of Western Europe, Australia, New 
Zealand, Japan, India, Israel, South Africa, and Canada, do not seem much inclined to 
revisit the wisdom of separating legislative and executive powers. To be clear, unlike Pro-
fessors Ackerman and Calabresi, I am not making any normative claims about the wisdom, 
desirability, or efficacy of a presidential system; instead, I am simply noting a fact: in global 
terms, the U.S. system of separation of powers is relatively rare. 
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does the concept of the separation of powers have such resonance in 
the United States, but fall so flat in the rest of the world? A comprehen-
sive answer to this question lies beyond the scope of this short Article, 
but some preliminary thoughts on the matter seem both necessary and 
appropriate. 
 First, just as one must not overstate the U.S. commitment to enforc-
ing the separation of legislative and executive powers,114 one must not 
overstate the degree to which the rest of the world has rejected the doc-
trine of the separation of powers (as opposed to its specific application 
in the context of mixed legislative and executive functions).115 Second, 
with respect to the United States, there must be something different 
about the citizenry’s attitude toward merged legislative and executive 
functions, or about government more generally, that leads to continuing 
widespread support for the concept, even to the present day.116 Third, 
and finally, there must be some offsetting costs and benefits to adopting 
and enforcing the separation of legislative and executive powers; the 
costs are plainly too high and the benefits too low for nations observing 
a parliamentary system of government, but not for the United States.117 
The balance of this section explores each of these themes. 
A. Global Rejection of U.S. Separation of Powers Concerns Is Only Partial 
 The broader world’s rejection of U.S. concerns about vesting legis-
lative and executive powers in the same hands should not be taken as a 
marker for a more general rejection of U.S. separation of powers no-
tions.118 In particular, the idea that judges should not have a vested in-
terest in the outcome of the cases that come before them appears to be 
an idea that has gained universal acceptance.119 Thus, even in places 
like the United Kingdom or France, that do not feature carefully sepa-
rated legislative and executive powers, one finds that judicial duties, 
and specifically the power of judicial review, do not rest with the legisla-
ture or the head of the executive branch (whether styled a prime minis-
ter or a president).120 
 In the United Kingdom, for example, the Appellate Committee of 
the House of Lords historically has exercised the judicial powers, serv-
                                                                                                                      
114 See Calabresi & Larsen, supra note 27, at 1078–79, 1081–84. 
115 See infra notes 118–139 and accompanying text. 
116 See infra notes 140–179 and accompanying text. 
117 See infra notes 180–194 and accompanying text. 
118 See Hyre, supra note 8, at 434–35. 
119 See id. at 437. 
120 See Jackson & Tushnet, supra note 7, at 471; Hyre, supra note 8, at 443. 
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ing as the highest domestic appellate court.121 Since 1883, and arguably 
since 1844, however, the House of Lords has not permitted hereditary 
peers to vote on appeals.122 The Appellate Committee, staffed entirely 
with persons learned in the law, and usually former lower court judges 
and legal academics, has exercised the judicial functions of the cham-
ber.123 Thus, although at a formal level the Parliament enjoyed plenary 
judicial power, in practice the United Kingdom recognized the need to 
insulate the business of the judiciary from the business of the legisla-
ture or the executive branch.124 
 More recently, Parliament approved the creation of a “Supreme 
Court of the United Kingdom” that, after becoming operational in Oc-
tober 2009, exercises the judicial power of the United Kingdom.125 The 
European Court of Human Rights found the British approach to the 
separation of powers to be an insufficient structural protection of judi-
cial independence in the context of local office that merged executive 
and judicial duties; the same structure existed, at least de jure, within 
the House of Lords.126 In practice, the Supreme Court of the United 
Kingdom, which will be entirely structurally separate and distinct from 
                                                                                                                      
121 P.S. Atiyah & Robert Summers, Form and Substance in Anglo-American Law: 
A Comparative Study of Legal Reasoning, Legal Theory, and Legal Institutions 
269 (1987). 
122 See Jackson & Tushnet, supra note 7, at 365–66 (“In theory, any peer may sit, unin-
vited, to hear an appeal. This last happened in 1883, when the intrusive lay peer’s opinion 
was superciliously ignored by the lawyers.”); John V. Orth, Book Review, 54 Tul. L. Rev. 
798, 802–03 (1980) (“First, the handling of the appeal of Daniel O’Connell, the Irish Lib-
erator, in 1844, established the distinction between the House of Lords as a judicial body 
and the House as a political body. When lords ‘unlearned in the law’ tried to register their 
votes against O’Connell, they were firmly told that the law lords alone constituted the 
court.”). See generally Robert Stevens, Law & Politics: The House of Lords as a Judi-
cial Body, 1800–1976 (1978) (explaining the separation of the House of Lords’ legislative 
and judicial roles and describing the professionalization of judicial duties). 
123 Atiyah & Summers, supra note 121, at 269. 
124 See id. 
125 See Constitution Reform Act, 2005, c. 4, § 23 (Eng.); see also Krotoszynski, supra 
note 19, at 186–87. 
126 See McGonnell v. United Kingdom, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. 289, 289, 308–09 (2000); see also 
Hyre, supra note 8, at 445, 446 (discussing McGonnell v. United Kingdom and how the deci-
sion motivated Parliament to transfer the workload of the Appellate Committee of the 
House of Lords to the now operational Supreme Court of the United Kingdom). On the 
creation and inauguration of the new Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, see Cassell 
Bryan-Low & Jess Bravin, A U.K. Court Without the Wigs, New Supreme Bench, Patterned on 
America’s, Stirs Debate, Wall St. J., Oct. 17–18, 2009, at A1, A10 (noting that the Supreme 
Court of the United Kingdom, which constitutes an entirely independent and structurally 
separate governmental entity from Parliament, has now assumed the jurisdiction of the 
Appellate Committee of the House of Lords, reviewing its institutional membership and 
powers, and describing the political history of this new U.K. judicial entity). 
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the House of Lords, will simply take over the functions of the Appellate 
Committee of the House of Lords.127 Whether formal or de facto, how-
ever, the United Kingdom has recognized and respected the need for 
an independent judiciary since at least the late 19th century.128 
 France provides another instructive example of the persuasive 
force of separation of powers concerns because it employs a system of 
limited judicial review that ensures compliance with the French Consti-
tution.129 The Conseil Constitutionnel, although not formally part of 
the French judiciary, is also not an office of either the National Assem-
bly or the Senate.130 The Conseil Constitutionnel is not a court, nor is it 
a legislative body; it exists outside both the judiciary and the legislature, 
exercising a power of post-enactment, pre-enforcement review of new 
legislation.131 
 In the 1980s, former Conseil Constitutionnel President Robert 
Badinter attempted to have that tribunal reconstituted as a formal 
court, whether as a “Constitutional Court” or a “Supreme Court,” with 
responsibility for hearing constitutional complaints from members of 
the legislature, but with an enhanced jurisdiction that would encom-
pass the ability to provide constitutional review on the basis of citizen 
complaints or judicial references of already promulgated laws.132 Al-
                                                                                                                      
127 See Hyre, supra note 8, at 448; Skold, supra note 70, at 2157–58. 
128 See Jackson & Tushnet, supra note 7, at 365–66. 
129 See id. at 505, 506. 
130 See id. at 509; see also John Bell, French Legal Cultures 33, 207 (2001) (noting 
that the Conseil Constitutionnel “is not formally a court” and therefore does not formally 
constitute part of the French judicial system and discussing the operation and jurisdiction 
of the Conseil Constitutionnel). See generally Alec Stone, The Birth of Judicial Politics 
in France: The Constitutional Council in Comparative Perspective 46–92 (1992) 
(discussing the theory of judicial review in French constitutional thought and tracing the 
history and institutional role of the Conseil Constitutionnel). 
131 Jackson & Tushnet, supra note 7, at 509. Nor is the Conseil Constitutionnel part of 
the executive branch of government. See Bell, supra note 107, at 20. A kind of institutional 
deus ex machina, it floats outside and above the traditional branches of government. Bell, 
supra note 130, at 33, 207, 216–17. Classic European constitutional theory conceives of 
judicial review as essentially occurring outside the regular operations of government. See 
Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State 154, 155 (Anders Wedberg trans., 
1945); Hans Kelsen, Judicial Review of Legislation: A Comparative Study of the Austrian and 
American Constitution, 4 J. Pol. 183, 186 (1942); see also Alec Stone Sweet, Why Europe Re-
jected American Judicial Review: And Why It May Not Matter, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 2744, 2765–70 
(2003) (tracing the influence of Kelsen’s theory of judicial review in Austria and through-
out Europe). See generally Bernd J. Hartmann, The Arrival of Judicial Review in Germany Under 
the Weimar Constitution of 1919, 18 BYU J. Pub. L. 107 (2003) (exploring the theoretical and 
practical difficulties of reconciling traditional European notions of parliamentary suprem-
acy with the practice of judicial review of legislative and executive actions). 
132 Bell, supra note 107, at 55–56; Stone, supra note 130, at 58–59. 
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though the French government did not adopt Badinter’s reform pro-
posals, the Conseil Constitutionnel retains a significant role in ensuring 
that new laws do not transgress constitutional norms.133 And, because 
since the early 1970s minority party members of the National Assembly 
and the Senate can invoke the review process, the Conseil Constitu-
tionnel maintains an active docket.134 
 The German Federal Constitutional Court provides perhaps the 
best model of the structural separation of judicial power from legisla-
tive and executive powers, in a system that otherwise observes a parlia-
mentary form of government that permits dual service in legislative 
and executive offices.135 Even though the principal officers of the ex-
ecutive branch of government also serve in the federal legislature, the 
Federal Constitutional Court exercises the power of judicial review un-
der the Basic Law free and clear of any legislative or executive control, 
and without any dual members serving both on the Constitutional 
Court and in the federal legislature.136 As Professor David Currie puts 
the matter, “[u]nlike the executive, the German courts are entirely in-
dependent” and “in several respects their power to act as a check on 
abuses of authority by other organs of government is better protected 
than that of courts in the United States.”137 
 Clearly, then, the world’s rejection of the U.S. model of the proper 
separation of powers is far from total; instead, only the U.S. obsession 
with prohibiting joint legislative and executive appointments has found 
an indifferent audience.138 Rather than resolving the question, how-
ever, it only makes the problem more confounding: even though U.S. 
concerns with separation of powers are widely shared in other democ-
ratic republics, the specific U.S. concern with the conflation of legisla-
tive and executive power has failed to gain any traction, not only in 
places like France or Germany, but also in neighboring common law 
jurisdictions like Canada.139 It is difficult to offer any firm answers for 
the failure of separation of legislative and executive powers to catch the 
imagination of other polities. That said, I offer a few preliminary ob-
                                                                                                                      
133 Bell, supra note 107, at 56; Stone, supra note 130, at 58–59. Professor Stone notes 
that “[h]ad the revision been successful, the Council’s role and functioning may well have 
been transformed.” Stone, supra note 130, at 59. 
134 See Jackson & Tushnet, supra note 7, at 515. 
135 See Currie, supra note 102, at 173; Donald P. Kommers, The Constitutional Ju-
risprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany 9–11, 115–18 (2d ed. 1997). 
136 Currie, supra note 102, at 172–73; Kommers, supra note 135, at 15–16, 131–32. 
137 Currie, supra note 102, at 149–50. 
138 Cf. Sartori, supra note 24, at 107. 
139 See Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (2003), supra note 19, at 259. 
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servations about why the separation of legislative and executive powers, 
a concern with such salience in the United States, represents a kind of 
“shot (not) heard ’round the world.” 
B. U.S. Citizens Reflexively Distrust Government 
 The United States, to this day, features a skepticism towards gov-
ernment and governmental institutions that is not widely shared in 
other nations.140 As Professor Michael Asimow has stated, “[a] general-
ized distrust of government officials and government power is a recur-
rent strain in American history.”141 To a remarkable degree, Americans 
tend to be hostile toward government and its motives.142 Running for 
an elected office in the United States on a platform that “Government 
Is Good!” would be a prescription for electoral disaster in most jurisdic-
tions. Indeed, not since Franklin D. Roosevelt has a national politician 
succeeded in forging a national electoral majority on the proposition 
that more government, not less government, is needed.143 And, FDR 
had the backdrop of the Great Depression to frame his arguments! 
 Both before and after the Great Depression, and certainly in the 
modern era since the election of Ronald Reagan as president in 1980, 
the rhetoric of U.S. politics has reflected a shared assumption that gov-
                                                                                                                      
140 This proposition is perhaps too obvious to require support, but the academic litera-
ture is rife with works that establish the truth of this assertion. See, e.g., Robert J. Blendon 
et al., Changing Attitudes in America, in Why People Don’t Trust Government 205, 205 
( Joseph S. Nye, Jr. et al. eds., 1997); Robert A. Kagan, Adversarial Legalism: The 
American Way of Law 14 (2001); John W. Kingdon, America the Unusual 23 (1999); 
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Atiyah & Summers, supra note 121, at 40. For a thoughtful and amusing historical over-
view of this political culture of distrust, see generally Wills, supra note 83. 
141 Michael Asimow, Popular Culture and the Adversary System, 40 Loyola L.A. L. Rev. 
653, 662 (2007). 
142 See id. at 663 (“A substantial number of Americans suspect government officials and 
agencies of meddlesomeness, incompetence, or corruption.”). 
143 See Kingdon, supra note 140, at 51, 84. 
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ernment is the problem, not the solution.144 Recall that President Bill 
Clinton, the next most recent member of the Democratic Party to serve 
as president, famously declared that “the era of big government is 
over.”145 He then worked assiduously to unravel the social safety net 
through legislation like the 1996 Welfare Reform Act.146 In a similar 
vein, President Barack Obama ran on a platform of reforming the fed-
eral government, not celebrating its accomplishments or the benefits of 
massively expanding its reach, except as necessary to address the cur-
rent financial and economic crises.147 To the extent that the contempo-
rary economic crisis has opened the door to more ambitious govern-
ment intervention in private markets, the new Obama Administration, 
like the Bush Administration before it, tends to style these efforts to 
combat the financial crisis as a necessary evil, rather than a positive or 
desirable permanent state of affairs.148 
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back to work and put money in their pockets, not because I believe in bigger govern-
ment—I don’t—not because I’m not mindful of the massive debt we’ve inherited—I am.”); 
see Peter Baker & John M. Broder, Obama Pledges Public Works on a Vast Scale, N.Y. Times, 
Dec. 7, 2008, at A1 (“‘We’ll measure progress by the reforms we make,’ Mr. Obama said, 
‘and the results we achieve by the jobs we create, by the energy we save, by whether Amer-
ica is more competitive in the world.’”); E.J. Dionne, Jr., Audacity Without Ideology, Wash. 
Post, Jan. 15, 2009, at A19 (arguing that President Obama’s commitment to expand fed-
eral programs to combat the economic downturn has been justified not on ideological 
terms, but rather on solely pragmatic grounds and noting that “Obama’s anti-ideological 
turn is also a functional one for a progressive, at least for now” and that “[s]ince Ronald 
Reagan, ideology has been the terrain of the right”). 
148 Obama, supra note 147 (arguing that, although the federal government must take 
aggressive action to meet the economic crisis, this is not “because I believe in bigger gov-
ernment—I don’t.”); see Robert J. Samuelson, The Limits of Pump Priming, Wash. Post, Jan. 
5, 2009, at A11 (“The stimulus qualifies as a necessary evil, a parachute against an eco-
nomic free fall.”); Gordon Trowbridge, Obama: Government Intervention Necessary, Detroit 
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 To a remarkable degree, U.S. citizens mistrust government and 
seek to minimize its ability to impact their daily lives.149 The unwieldy 
design of the federal government, replicated in all of the states save 
Nebraska, which has a unicameral legislature,150 incorporates the no-
tion that slowing down the ability of government to act is a good, not 
bad, idea.151 For reasons having to do with an idiosyncratic political cul-
ture, “government” in the contemporary United States is something of 
a four-letter word. I do not wish to essentialize the attitudes of citizens 
of Canada, France, Germany, or Japan, but my strong impression is that 
citizens in these nations do not view government with the same level of 
skepticism, if not outright hostility, that U.S. citizens often manifest to-
ward their own governing institutions.152 
                                                                                                                      
News, Feb. 7, 2009, at A1 (“President Obama said Monday the economic stimulus package 
he is pressing through Congress ‘is not perfect,’ but it is critical to get the United States 
economy back on its feet.”); Richard Wolf, A Bold Course for Dire Times, USA Today, Jan. 9, 
2009, at A1 (reporting that the Obama administration has justified its stimulus program as 
necessary to avoid “sinking ‘deeper into a crisis that at some point, we may not be able to 
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149 See generally Mark R. Levin, Liberty and Tyranny: A Conservative Manifesto 
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totalitarian form of socialism, termed “statism,” under President Obama and the Democ-
ratic Party leadership of Congress, sold almost a million copies in 2009 and appeared on 
the New York Times nonfiction bestsellers list for weeks. See id. at 11, 13, 39, 193; Bestsellers, 
Nonfiction: Sunday, July 12, 2009, N.Y. Times, July 12, 2009, at 18 (listing Liberty and Tyranny 
as the second best selling nonfiction book in the United States for the prior week, down 
from the number one position a week earlier, and noting that the work has been on the 
bestsellers list for fourteen consecutive weeks). 
150 Neb. Const. art. III, § 1; see James A. Gardner, Liberty, Community and the Constitu-
tional Structure of Political Influence: A Reconsideration of the Right to Vote, 145 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
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151 As Professor Gary Wills sarcastically observes, “[i]nefficiency is to be our safeguard 
against despotism.” Wills, supra note 83, at 319. Even though Wills identifies this as part 
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152 See Jacob S. Hacker, The Road to Nowhere 86 (1997) (noting traditional distrust 
of government by U.S. citizens); Alan F. Westin, The United States Bill of Rights and the Cana-
dian Charter: A Socio-Political Analysis, in The U.S. Bill of Rights and the Canadian 
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 The U.S. obsession with impeding the ability of government to act 
is entirely rational if one views government as a problem, rather than as 
the provider of solutions.153 And, a more efficient, streamlined model 
of governance, one that empowers rather than impedes the ability of 
government to act, makes perfect sense in a polity where citizens re-
pose faith in the ability of the government to make wise decisions on a 
predictable basis.154 One still needs to inquire into the source of U.S. 
hostility toward government and its institutions. 
 My own view is that U.S. hostility toward government is a feature of 
the pluralistic nature of the United States; the United States was, in 
large measure, a nation built not on ties of religion, ethnic kinship, or 
even geography, but rather on immigration.155 In such a cultural jamba-
laya, is it at all surprising to find that members of one ethnic group 
might view with suspicion and hostility the motives and actions of gov-
ernment officials who happen to be members of another ethnic 
group?156 Should Irish-American citizens of Chicago feel sanguine 
about the prospects of fair treatment if persons of Polish ancestry cur-
rently control City Hall?157 Will Irish neighborhoods receive the same 
level of city services, the same access to city employment, the same level 
of funding for local schools as the Polish neighborhoods?158 Certainly 
problems of unequal division of government benefits have been sub-
stantially reduced as the federal and state courts have aggressively en-
forced the mandate of the Equal Protection Clause.159 The political his-
                                                                                                                      
Charter of Rights and Freedoms 27, 31 (William R. McKercher ed., 1983) (“Americans 
are inordinately distrustful of government, and are, for the most part, suspicious of all 
authority, religious, economic or otherwise.”). But cf. Claire L’Heureux-Dube, Outsiders on 
the Bench: The Continuing Struggle for Equality, 16 Wis. Women’s L.J. 15, 18 (2001) (“Whereas 
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153 Cf. Asimow, supra note 141, at 662. 
154 See L’Heureux-Dube, supra note 152, at 18; see also Currie, supra note 102, at 172. 
155 See Wills, supra note 83, at 17. 
156 See Juan F. Perea, Demography and Distrust: An Essay on American Languages, Cultural 
Pluralism, and Official English, 77 Minn. L. Rev. 269, 277 (1992). 
157 See Scott Simon, Windy City: A Novel of Politics 71 (2008). 
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tory of the United States, however, is one of deep-seated suspicion that 
one group is trying to use government to its own unfair advantage.160 
 The division lines are hardly limited to those based on ethnicity or 
race.161 Religious differences, for better or worse, have played a major 
role in U.S. politics.162 There is no national church; such an institution, 
by creating a common bond among citizens, could help to create a 
shared cultural identity.163 Instead, religious pluralism has always been a 
distinguishing characteristic of the United States.164 This religious plu-
ralism provides a testament to the diversity of the American people— 
but it also can serve as a basis for mistrust and skepticism among and 
between citizens of different faiths.165 
 For example, U.S. voters have not always been open to electing per-
sons who belong to unfamiliar (or unpopular) religious groups.166 In 
1960, John Kennedy faced skepticism from many Protestant voters be-
cause of his Roman Catholic faith.167 In 2008, Mitt Romney also faced 
substantial skepticism associated with his lifelong membership in the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, commonly known as the 
Mormons.168 The actor Tom Cruise has been openly mocked in major 
mass media outlets because of his aggressive and public support of the 
Church of Scientology.169 
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 Although the election of a Roman Catholic to public office is no 
longer a novelty, the election of a Mormon to the presidency would be a 
major development towards religious equality, and the election of a Sci-
entologist would be, mostly for discreditable reasons, entirely implausi-
ble in the contemporary United States.170 Indeed, during the 2008 elec-
tion campaign, President Barack Obama faced persistent, and false, 
rumors that he is a follower of Islam, precisely because it is widely as-
sumed that U.S. voters would never elect a Muslim to the presidency.171 
 These “us/them” divisions have other vectors—regional concerns, 
urban/rural concerns, and cultural concerns.172 Residents of Massa-
chusetts do not wish to be governed by the Mississippi state legislature, 
and the feeling is mutual.173 Going back to the time of the framing of 
the U.S. Constitution, strong factions, whether defined by race, ethnic-
ity, religion, region, or urbanization have been a persistent feature of 
domestic politics.174 These divisions create suspicion of those drawn 
from outsider groups and, ultimately, of government itself because 
members of outsider groups might well enjoy a majority in the city 
council, the state legislature, or the Congress.175 
 In a nation sharing a common ethnic, religious, and cultural heri-
tage, trust in government might well come more naturally, and be held 
more readily, than in a nation built of immigrants that still features sig-
nificant divisions based on race, ethnicity, religion, region, urbaniza-
tion, and culture.176 Thus, it should not be particularly surprising that 
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the citizens of the United Kingdom or Germany do not fear “tyranny” 
from a central government in which members of the national legisla-
ture also head the major executive departments of the government.177 
When government features people drawn from a common national 
culture, who share longstanding ties of language, religion, and kinship, 
it is not at all surprising that citizens would repose more trust, more 
reflexively, than when institutions of government are staffed by persons 
viewed in important respects as outsiders.178 
 There is, in all of this, a potential cautionary tale: as the nations of 
Europe become less homogeneous due to immigration from Africa and 
Asia, will these newcomers accept the legitimacy of the existing gov-
ernmental institutions as readily as those who have longer temporal, 
cultural, and genealogical ties to the polity? In other words, if humans 
are naturally suspicious when governed by persons who have significant 
differences, perceived as salient, from them, will newcomers accept the 
proposition that “government is good” as readily as those whose fami-
lies have older ties? Or will the newcomers, like most U.S. citizens, tend 
to view government skeptically? 
 To be clear, I am not predicting a mass wave toward adoption of 
measures to separate legislative and executive powers. The merger of 
these powers in parliamentary systems is unlikely to disappear any time 
soon. I would suggest, however, that the adoption of this form of sepa-
ration of powers in the United States is not a mere accident of history, 
but instead represents a logical response by people who feared the con-
sequence of being a political, cultural, religious, or regional minority.179 
C. An Alternative (but Complementary) Explanation: U.S. Citizens  
Demand an Independent Political Check, as Well as a Judicial  
Check, on Legislative Majorities 
 A distinct, but undoubtedly related, explanation of the U.S. enthu-
siasm for enforcing the separation of legislative and executive powers 
relates to a desire to provide not merely a legal or constitutional check 
on legislative policymaking, but a political check as well.180 Judicial review 
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ers”). 
177 Cf. Cross, supra note 176, at 1534. 
178 See id. 
179 See id.; Redish & Cisar, supra note 31, at 468, 469. 
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of legislative work product provides an important—indeed crucial— 
check on arbitrary or fundamentally unjust legislative actions.181 But 
judicial review should not serve as a generic policy or political review of 
the wisdom of legislative action.182 Separating legislative and executive 
power has the salutary effect of facilitating an independent political 
check on the exercise of legislative power.183 As Professor Strauss ex-
plains, the President’s “powers vis-à-vis government in general and Con-
gress in particular were to be sufficient to give some assurance of main-
taining a continuing tension over ultimate political authority between 
himself and Congress—no one branch was to become dominant.”184 
                                                                                                                      
181 See id. at 260. 
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task that he viewed as laying beyond judicial ken: 
There is a dangerous tendency in these latter days to enlarge the functions of 
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184 Strauss, supra note 183, at 641. 
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 By vesting the President, and the President alone, with a veto, the 
Framers ensured that an independent review of legislation would occur 
prior to a bill becoming a law, and vested that power of review in a per-
son uniquely accountable to the whole citizenry.185 In the absence of 
the separation of legislative and executive powers, one would lose the 
benefit of bringing an independent political judgment to bear on legis-
lation.186 In addition, the merger of legislative and executive offices also 
denies, or at least mutes, independent political judgment being 
brought to bear in the implementation of legislation.187 
 Providing an independent political check on government action 
also ensures that capture of the legislature by a particular group or fac-
tion would not inexorably lead to the adoption of self-serving, but 
poorly conceived, policies.188 The President, and the independent ex-
ecutive branch, can and would provide a check against legislative ex-
cesses (or simple cases of poor judgment).189 Thus, those unhappy with 
the outcome of the legislative process can and do seek redress either 
within the executive branch or from the federal courts.190 
 In sum, from an American perspective, the kind of check provided 
by the judiciary, and the kind of check provided by an independent, 
unitary executive branch, are fundamentally different in nature and not 
fungible.191 A judicial review should not assess the wisdom or prudence 
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of legislative policies, but rather only their legality or constitutionality.192 
The President, by way of contrast, can consider a much broader range of 
potential objections to a new law prior to its taking effect.193 Moreover, 
this independent political judgment comes to bear both when the 
President decides whether to sign or veto a bill and also when determin-
ing how to implement the new law. Judicial review is simply not a func-
tional equivalent, precisely because its proper scope is so limited.194 
Conclusion 
 The U.S. Constitution of 1787 has provided a very influential 
blueprint for those drafting constitutions in other nations. In one im-
portant respect, however, the Constitution has not proven influential: 
the world largely has rejected the Framers’ concerns with separating 
and dividing legislative and executive power. Although the parliamen-
tary model of government remains commonplace, it might be worth 
considering the possible relationship between a strong commitment to 
separation of powers and political, ethnic, racial, religious, and cultural 
pluralism within a body politic. The drafters of the U.S. Constitution 
clearly believed that separating and limiting powers would enhance the 
perceived legitimacy of the institutions of government, by making uni-
lateral action more difficult. In a nation featuring myriad self-perceived 
minorities, making government action more difficult might well corre-
spond with a greater sense of security within the citizenry.195 
 At the same time, however, the fact that parliamentary forms of 
government in nations with multicultural populations, like Canada, 
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enjoy broad public confidence notwithstanding the absence of separa-
tion of legislative and executive powers provides strong evidence that 
this particular protection is not essential to the creation or mainte-
nance of a legitimate government. Indeed, if one contrasts the adop-
tion of the separation of legislative and executive powers with the wide-
spread, indeed almost universal, adoption of written constitutions, 
providing written bills of rights, enforceable by an independent judici-
ary vested with the power of judicial review, it becomes obvious that en-
trenched human rights are far more important to securing legitimacy 
than separating legislative and executive powers.196 Thus, if citizens may 
seek recourse to the courts to protect their basic human rights from 
government abridgement or abrogation, the vesting of legislative and 
executive powers in the same hands does not seem to present a major 
concern for most citizens. To state the matter a bit differently: so long 
as some independent check on legislative power exists, the fact that the 
executive branch does not provide a check on the legislative branch is 
not utterly fatal to the perceived legitimacy of a constitutional order. 
 The U.S. commitment to maintaining a political check on legisla-
tive powers via a separate and independent executive branch reflects 
and incorporates an assumption that Congress will get matters wrong 
with some frequency and that the judiciary’s proper role cannot extend 
to serving as a generic council of revision. At the end of the day, then, 
skepticism about government in general and legislatures in particular, 
ultimately helps to explain the U.S. approach to separating and divid-
ing legislative and executive powers. 
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